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BLACK-BOX IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM
Immigration Outside the Law. By Hiroshi Motomura.  New York:
Oxford University Press (2014). Pp. xiii, 235. $29.95.
David S. Rubenstein*
Introduction
In Immigration Outside the Law, Hiroshi Motomura1 confronts the three
hardest questions in immigration today: what to do about our undocu-
mented population, who should decide, and by what legal process.
Motomura’s treatment is characteristically visionary, analytically rich, and
eminently fair to competing views. The book’s intellectual arc begins with its
title: “Immigration Outside the Law.” As the narrative unfolds, however,
Motomura explains that undocumented immigrants are “Americans in wait-
ing,” with moral and legal claims to societal integration (pp. 86, 89,
204–05).
Ushering immigration outside the law, inside of it, is no easy feat. The
route is partly obstructed by politics,2 and partly by the Constitution itself.
After all, the Constitution’s separation of federal power and finely wrought
lawmaking process makes national solutions elusive.3 Meanwhile, the Con-
stitution’s federalist structure provides a platform for state and local resis-
tance to the wide-scale integration of undocumented immigrants that
* Professor of Law, Director of the Center for Law and Government, Washburn
University School of Law. Like so many in the immigration community, I am indebted to
Hiroshi Motomura for his leadership and mentorship. He also provided generous feedback on
an early draft, which helped to clarify my views in relation to his. I am also grateful for the
helpful comments and suggestions provided by Patrick Charles, Erin Delaney, Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, Kevin Johnson, Stephen Lee, Peter Margulies, Juliet Stumpf, and Washburn
colleagues Alex Glashausser and William Rich. I also thank my assistant Penny Fell, and the
Michigan Law Review for outstanding editorial work.
1. Susan Westerberg Prager Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
2. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, Getting to Maybe: Inside the Gang of Eight’s Immigration Deal,
New Yorker (June 24, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/06/24/getting-to-
maybe [http://perma.cc/LBR3-M4AS] (discussing some of the reasons why comprehensive im-
migration efforts have stalled in Congress); Alan K. Simpson & Bruce A. Morrison, Opinion, A
Way Out on Immigration Reform, N.Y. Times (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
03/18/opinion/a-way-out-on-immigration-reform.html [http://perma.cc/P323-GDZJ] (“The
goal of fixing our broken immigration system is further away than ever.”).
3. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (holding
that a unicameral legislative veto violated the separation of powers); Texas v. United States, 809
F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (preliminarily enjoining an executive branch program, called De-
ferred Action for Parents of Americans, that, inter alia, would confer temporary “lawful pres-
ence” to millions of undocumented immigrants), cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257, (U.S. Jan. 19,
2016) (No. 15-674); President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration
(Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/21/remarks-president-
983
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Motomura envisions.4 And despite the Constitution’s guarantee of equal
protection, it hardly protects this population from restrictionist policies at
both the federal and subfederal levels.5
Immigration Outside the Law offers a path through these constitutional
thickets.6 But the path requires some departures from mainstream constitu-
tional norms. As I will explain, Motomura blends elements of constitutional
structure and rights into a mold that I call “Black-Box Immigration Federal-
ism.” I employ the black box metaphor here to reflect a system with known
external effects but with opaque internal functions.7 Outwardly, Black-Box
Immigration Federalism reduces to the seemingly simple formula that “fed-
eral law overrides any inconsistent state or local law” (p. 7). The formula
looks about right, and many commentators seem to accept it on faith. Yet
beneath the formula’s tidy veneer is a cache of legal uncertainties, complexi-
ties, and potential contractions. Foremost among them are what qualifies as
federal law, how that law should be calibrated when it looks different in
action than it does on the books, and conversions of nonbinding executive
enforcement policies into federal law with preemptive effect.8 Emphatically,
Motomura’s treatment of the “federal law” preemption formula is refresh-
ingly self-aware and entirely transparent. It is the formula itself, however,
that entails far more than it outwardly suggests. The black box metaphor is
simply meant to draw attention to those inward complexities.
More specifically, Black-Box Immigration Federalism treats the federal
government as an undifferentiated whole, and from that starting position
immigration [http://perma.cc/VTZ7-77FG] (“We’re going to keep on working with members
of Congress to make permanent reform a reality. But until that day comes, there are actions
that I have the legal authority to take that will help make our immigration system more fair
and more just.”).
4. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) (“Federalism, central to the
constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have
elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”); see also State Laws Related to Immigra-
tion and Immigrants, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/re
search/immigration/state-laws-related-to-immigration-and-immigrants.aspx [http://perma.cc/
44XM-4KJZ] (tracking steady rise in immigration-related state laws and resolutions over the
past decade).
5. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82–83 (1976) (applying rational basis test to
federal alienage classification); see also infra Part II (discussing jurisprudential obstacles to
equal protection relief for undocumented immigrants); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219
n.19, 223 (1982) (generally eschewing heightened scrutiny of state laws directed at undocu-
mented immigrants).
6. See infra Part I (summarizing Motomura’s approach).
7. Cf. Cambridge Dictionaries Online, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/
business-english/black-box [http://perma.cc/9CS2-BLET] (defining “black box” as “a system
or process that uses information to produce a particular set of results, but that works in a way
that is secret or difficult to understand”); Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/black%20box [http://perma.cc/XP6B-SEB3] (defining “black box” broadly as
“anything that has mysterious or unknown internal functions or mechanisms”). Although I do
think the black box metaphor fits, nothing in my analysis below depends on it.
8. See infra Part II.
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embeds some or all of the following propositions. First, the federal govern-
ment can freely choose to make law by statute, regulation, or otherwise (pp.
122–23). Second, nonbinding federal policies qualify as law (pp. 121, 123).
Third, immigration “law in action” (p. 4) takes presumptive precedence over
Congress’s laws on the books (pp. 121, 123–24). Fourth, executive enforce-
ment policies, which are not binding as against the federal government, are
nevertheless binding on state and local jurisdictions. So, in the event of a
conflict between executive enforcement policies and subfederal law, the for-
mer trumps.9 Fifth, restrictionist state and local immigration policies are
presumptively preempted by incorporation of an “equality norm” into
Supremacy Clause challenges.10 Collectively, the foregoing propositions feed
Black-Box Immigration Federalism and are captured within Motomura’s
framing statement that “federal law overrides any inconsistent state or local
law” (p. 7).
Black-Box Immigration Federalism is a serious idea with serious intel-
lectual backing.11 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United
States hints at something like it, albeit with mixed signals.12 This Review
9. Pp. 123, 126; see infra Part II.
10. Pp. 133-35, 152; see infra Part III.
11. Motomura is a leading champion of this cause, but he is joined by a veritable chorus
of commentators and practitioners. On the preemptive force of executive enforcement policies,
see, for example, Brief for the United States at 15, 22, 50, 53, Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182); Brief Amicus Curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center in
Support of Respondent at 13–14, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182); Kerry Abrams, Ple-
nary Power Preemption, 99 Va. L. Rev. 601, 639 (2013); Jennifer M. Chaco´n, The Transforma-
tion of Immigration Federalism, 21 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 577 (2012); Gabriel J. Chin &
Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal
Law, 61 Duke L.J. 251 (2011); Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers and the
President’s Power to Preempt, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 691 (2014). On the importation of an
equality norm into preemption analysis, see, for example, Chaco´n, supra; Mary D. Fan, Post-
Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-“Alien” Laws and Unity-Rebuilding Frames for
Antidiscrimination Values, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 905 (2011); Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten
Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1870, 8 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1 (2013); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil
Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 609 (2012); Michael A.
Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper
Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 27, 28; Carrie L. Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality
Principles in Preemption Analysis of Sub-federal Immigration Laws: The California TRUST Act,
18 Chap. L. Rev. 481, 483, 523 (2015); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement
of Immigration Laws, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084 (2004).
12. See 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (finding one of the state laws preempted on the partial ground
that state law “could be exercised without any input from the Federal Government [meaning
the executive] about whether an arrest is warranted in a particular case,” thus “allow[ing] the
State to achieve its own immigration policy”). In a partially concurring and partially dissent-
ing opinion, Justice Alito described as “remarkable” the federal administration’s position that
“a state law may be pre-empted, not because it conflicts with a federal statute or regulation,
but because it is inconsistent with a federal agency’s current enforcement priorities. . . .
[which] are not law.” Id. at 2527 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
majority opinion, however, did not directly engage this objection. See David S. Rubenstein,
The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 38 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 267, 280–81, 281 n.62
(2015) (explaining the ways in which the Court’s signals were mixed on the issue of whether
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does not deny the constitutional or normative possibilities of Black-Box Im-
migration Federalism. Rather, my threefold aim is to bridge some gaps be-
tween immigration and constitutional theory, provide alternative views to
Motomura’s in these regards, and explain why Black-Box Immigration Fed-
eralism should not be taken for granted—perhaps especially by immigrant
advocates. As I will explain, this intriguing constitutional construct may do
as much to undermine as advance immigrant interests in the long run, if not
also in the short.
Constitutionally, each of the animating features of Black-Box Immigra-
tion Federalism sketched above has potentially far-reaching implications.13
Immigration law is famously exceptional in the sense that it sometimes de-
parts from mainstream constitutional and administrative norms.14 Yet
whether immigration is exceptional in the ways that Motomura suggests,
and whether it should be, remain vital questions for the future of immigra-
tion law.15 Moreover, we must be scrupulous about whether structural doc-
trines can, or should, be a vehicle for the wide-scale integration that
Motomura envisions. Certainly, Black-Box Immigration Federalism may
bode well for undocumented immigrants in the short run, which may ex-
plain some of its appeal. With Congress gridlocked, undocumented immi-
grants generally will benefit from the combined effects of an executive
branch that is unable or unwilling to enforce existing removal statutes,16 and
a robust preemption doctrine that prevents state and local governments
from filling the enforcement gap. But, instrumentally, Black-Box Immigra-
tion Federalism comes with a major limitation: any promise it holds for
promoting wide-scale integration is politically contingent. As a structural
prophylactic, Black-Box Immigration Federalism allocates power, not social
outcomes.
executive enforcement policies can, or did, have preemptive effect); Eric Posner, The Imperial
President of Arizona, Slate (June 26, 2012, 12:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/06/
the_supreme_court_s_arizona_immigration_ruling_and_the_imperial_presidency_.html
[http://perma.cc/6QH-AZC8] (observing that the Arizona majority found certain provisions
of S.B. 1070 preempted, not because it conflicts with federal law, but because it “conflicts with
the president’s policy”).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1
(1984) (“Immigration has long been a maverick, a wild card, in our public law. Probably no
other area of American law has been so radically insulated and divergent from those funda-
mental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role that animate
the rest of our legal system.”).
15. See infra Parts II & III. Because immigration is sometimes treated exceptionally under
the law, and other times not, there are no clear guideposts for which constitutional norms to
relax, and which to insist on, in this new era of institutional conflict. I am currently working
on a project with Deep Gulasekaram—titled “Immigration Exceptionalism(s)”—that explores
this complication, and tension, within immigration law. For a recent claim that the Roberts
Court is moving toward immigration normalization, see Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the
Supreme Court, 2009-13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 Okla. L. Rev. 57
(2015).
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1227(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
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Of course, it is too soon to know whether Black-Box Immigration Fed-
eralism can or will deliver an enduring platform for the integration of un-
documented immigrants. It depends on how the allocated federal power is
used (or abused).17 That uncertainty, however, is reason for pause. Immigra-
tion constitutional doctrine tends to be sticky—in ways often unfavorable to
immigrant interests, and difficult to undo.18 Caution is thus warranted
before placing faith in structural arrangements that simultaneously consoli-
date federal power and relax checks against it, which is precisely what Black-
Box Immigration Federalism portends to do.
I. Ushering Immigration Outside the Law Inside the Law
One of Immigration Outside the Law’s most ingenious contributions is
the analytical framework it offers for understanding and shaping responses
to unauthorized immigration (pp. 3–5). The framework derives from Plyler
v. Doe, in which the Supreme Court held that a state’s denial of K-12 public
education to undocumented immigrants violated equal protection.19 Plyler’s
actual holding was quite limited, which Motomura is quick to acknowl-
edge.20 Instead, what matters are three themes Motomura culls from that
case, which he claims have shaped debates over undocumented immigration
ever since: first, the meaning and significance of unlawful immigration; sec-
ond, the state and local role in regulating unauthorized migration; and third,
the integration of this population into the fabric of American life (pp.
10–13). This framework provides new egress to the question of what to do
about unlawful immigration, which is mostly for political consumption. My
focus here, however, is on Motomura’s application of this framework to
17. Cf. Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
Vand. L. Rev. 787, 831 (2008) (“[T]here is no structural reason to believe that one level of
government will be more or less welcoming to non-citizens and therefore, on this basis, to
favor uniformity over experimentalism.”).
18. Cf. David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 Okla. L.
Rev. 29 (2015); Victor C. Romero, Devolution and Discrimination, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am.
L. 377, 378 (2003) (“Despite calls among many to dismantle it, Congress’s plenary power over
immigration, and the executive’s concomitant authority to enforce it, are likely here to
stay . . . .”). See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 601, 605 (2001) (“[C]ourts’
early resolutions of legal issues can become locked-in and resistant to change.”). The literature
on the plenary power doctrine is legion. For some of Motomura’s views and his critique of the
doctrine, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545 (1990). See also Stephen
H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22
Hastings Const. L.Q. 925 (1995) (critiquing the doctrine and collecting sources of others
who also do).
19. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). For an in-depth treatment of Plyler, its aftermath, and future
implications, see Michael A. Olivas, No Undocumented Child Left Behind (2012).
20. P. 9; cf. Stephen Lee, Growing Up Outside the Law, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1405 (2015)
(book review) (raising questions about Motomura’s reliance on Plyler as an analytical frame,
and offering, in its place, a “membership as brokering” approach for understanding some
unauthorized migrants’ claims to be treated as Americans in waiting).
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constitutional questions concerning who should decide what to do about
unlawful immigration, and, procedurally, how those decisions must or may
be made.
The book’s first three chapters explore each of the Plyler themes sepa-
rately, in seriatim. Chapter One argues that being present in the United
States without authorization is legally inconclusive, in part because “the
consequences of unlawful presence are highly variable, depending on the
exercise of enforcement discretion.” (p. 13). Here, Motomura deflects (or
deflates) the significance of Congress’s immigration law on the books, and,
instead, emphasizes immigration law in action (p. 13). Of equal import,
Motomura contends that unlawful status is inconclusive and indeterminate
by national design (pp. 21–22, 31). “[T]he uncertainty that selective discre-
tion creates for unauthorized migrants,” he argues, “is an essential part of
the system itself” (p. 53). This descriptive point is foundational to his pre-
scriptive claims, in later chapters, about what the nation owes this popula-
tion on moral and legal grounds.
Chapter Two provides a descriptive account of the state and local role in
immigration matters. That role has varied over time and across jurisdic-
tions.21 Here, Motomura mostly tracks convention to sort subfederal laws
into “restrictionist” and “integrationist” classifications: the former are char-
acterized by their hostility to undocumented immigrants, whereas the latter
create a neutral or welcoming environment for this population. Because it is
relevant to the discussion that follows, examples of restrictionist laws include
those giving state and local officials a role in detection, arrest, and detention
of noncitizens on the basis of federal immigration violations. Restrictionist
laws also make it difficult or impossible for undocumented immigrants to
rent housing, find work, or attend public schools. Examples of integrationist
measures, by contrast, include so-called sanctuary or non-cooperation laws,
which limit state and local officers from identifying and apprehending indi-
viduals for immigration violations, and laws that provide public benefits to
unauthorized immigrants, such as in-state college tuition or municipal iden-
tification cards (pp. 58–59, 80–81).
Chapter Three examines the integration of unauthorized immigrants
into American society. It begins by probing the tension between national
borders, on the one hand, and the American commitment to equality, on
the other. Here, Motomura argues that integrating and affording immi-
grants a pathway to full membership is necessary to justify national borders
(pp. 90–91). And, partly for that reason, he argues that the nation has a
moral (if not also a legal) obligation to recognize and integrate unauthorized
immigrants.22
21. See pp. 56–85 (explaining some of the variations, across the dimensions of time and
jurisdiction); see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration
(1776–1875), 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1835, 1841–80 (1993) (explaining that in the first 100
years of the republic, immigration regulation was dominated by the states, not the federal
government).
22. P. 110. Motomura tables the “legal” question for later chapters.
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After laying this foundation, the book’s next three chapters consider
how Plyler’s thematic strands intersect and relate in ways that each alone
cannot fully capture. Here is where the contours of Black-Box Immigration
Federalism come into sharper view.
Specifically, Chapter Four considers immigration enforcement authority
by linking the themes of what it means to be unlawfully present and the role
of subfederal governments. Motomura suggests that the “power to make law
includes the power to select the mode of law,” and that “the federal govern-
ment’s decisions—no matter what form they take—override state or local
law” (pp. 122–23). Moreover, he argues that “[t]he operation of immigra-
tion law in practice strongly suggests that the exercise of federal executive
discretion in enforcement supplies the real content of federal immigration
law for the purpose of deciding what is inconsistent with state and local
decisions” (p. 124). On this view, “federal immigration law consists of both
action and inaction, so no gap exists for state and local law to fill” (p. 121).
Critically, however, Motomura eschews this no-gap-filling principle for state
and local integrationist policies. The reason for this dichotomy, Motomura
explains, is that restrictionist measures are far more likely than their integra-
tionist foils to upset equality principles, either on the face of the laws them-
selves or in their application. Limiting state and local immigration
enforcement, he claims, is a “way of preventing discrimination . . . before it
might happen” (p. 115).
After explaining why state and local restrictionist measures should be
preempted, Motomura explains in Chapter Five why subfederal integration-
ist policies should flourish. For this, Motomura joins another pair of
themes—the subfederal role and the integration of undocumented immi-
grants. He observes that states and localities are the de facto sites of integra-
tion, and that these political communities can be well-suited to that function
(pp. 165, 167).
Chapter Six makes the last thematic link, between the meaning of un-
lawful presence and the integration of unauthorized migrants. Whereas
Motomura suggests in earlier chapters that many undocumented immi-
grants have strong claims to being treated as Americans in waiting based on
individualized equities (pp. 111, 163), this chapter promotes categorical ap-
proaches that would offer most unauthorized immigrants legal status, or at
least a path to it (pp. 204–06). Generally, Motomura disfavors hardline ap-
proaches that would deny legal recognition to the unauthorized population
that we, as a nation, have both created and tolerated for so long.23 Moreover,
he argues, categorical legalization programs will be more faithful to the rule
of law than haphazard, ad hoc, case-by-case executive decisionmaking.24
23. See pp. 196–200, 207.
24. Pp. 186, 204–06. Chapter 7 concludes the book. Here, Motomura begins a conversa-
tion about how to rework the immigration system to avoid repeating the same debates over
legalization in future generations (p. 208). These proposals range from designing guest-worker
programs, limited amnesty programs, and international development, see pp. 209–15, 218–23,
but are not my focus here.
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II. Cracking Open the Black Box
This Part probes deeper into the mechanics of Black-Box Immigration
Federalism. As already noted, many commentators and practitioners—in-
cluding lawyers in the Obama administration—seem to ascribe to some ver-
sion of this constitutional construct.25 Here, I am foremost interested in
Motomura’s views, which are emblematic and at the forefront of this con-
ceptual movement.
According to Motomura:
1. The federal government can freely choose its lawmaking modes;26
2. Nonbinding enforcement policies may qualify as federal law;27
3. In the event of possible conflict between Congress’s law on the books
and the “law in action,” the latter takes presumptive precedence, at
least for purposes of preemption;28
4. Executive enforcement policies, which are not binding on the federal
government, can nevertheless bind state and local actors;29 and
5. State and local restrictionist laws, but not subfederal integrationist
laws, should be presumptively preempted by incorporation of an
“equality norm” into preemption analysis.30
This is a significant collection of ideas. Before turning to each, I offer some
preliminary thoughts to frame the discussion that follows.
First, considerable headway will be made here if the exceptional quality
of Black-Box Immigration Federalism is brought to the fore. Motomura of-
fers incisive views on how the Constitution may apply to immigration. But
the significance of his account might be lost if not contextualized within the
larger constitutional system, and in juxtaposition to mainstream constitu-
tional norms.
Second, Black-Box Immigration Federalism is a new frontier. It sub-
sumes but extends well beyond the “exclusivity principle” in immigration
law.31 In theory, that principle awards the federal government a monopoly
25. See sources cited supra note 11. R
26. P. 122 (“[T]he power to make law includes the power to select the mode of
law . . . .”); p. 123 (“Federal lawmaking power includes the power to choose whether Congress
or the executive branch makes that law.”).
27. P. 121 (“The decision not to enforce in some situations is part of federal immigration
law.”); p. 123 (“[T]he federal government is free to set out federal immigration law not only in
the letter of federal statutes or regulations, but also in federal patterns of discretionary
enforcement.”).
28. P. 124 (“The operation of immigration law in practice strongly suggests that the
exercise of federal executive discretion in enforcement supplies the real content of federal im-
migration law for the purpose of deciding what is inconsistent with state and local
decisions.”).
29. See pp. 123, 126.
30. See pp. 133–35, 152; see also infra Part III.
31. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the entry
of aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted exclusively to Congress . . . .”); Truax
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over “immigration regulation.”32 Yet that is bounded domain. The Supreme
Court narrowly describes immigration regulation as laws governing the ad-
mission and expulsion of noncitizens.33 So construed, the exclusivity princi-
ple has little or no bearing on state and local “alienage regulation,” which is
the balance of laws that pertain to noncitizens,34 and where most of the
federalism action is today. Indeed, the Supreme Court treated Arizona’s flag-
ship restrictionist laws as alienage regulation rather than immigration regu-
lation,35 despite Arizona’s statutorily declared purpose to make “attrition
through enforcement” the state’s public policy.36
Third, Black-Box Immigration Federalism’s operative features are not
static. For instance, if Congress passes a law in direct response to an execu-
tive policy, propositions 2 through 4 might be relaxed to the point of being
overcome. Or, for example, courts may invoke the exclusivity principle to
structurally preempt a state regulation directed at the admission or expul-
sion of noncitizens, without reliance on any of the foregoing propositions.
But these sorts of examples are the exceptions and, more importantly, do
not capture what we have today: a dormant Congress, an executive branch
unable or unwilling to enforce existing removal statutes, unprecedented
levels of state and local alienage regulation, and a mostly inert exclusivity
principle.37
Fourth, the propositions straddle federalism and separation of powers,
at times toggling between them seamlessly. That crossover can lead to some
confusion. But, as developed further below, the crossover also exposes Black-
Box Immigration Federalism to critique, inasmuch as this construct may
disregard structural seams woven into the Constitution.38
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (“The authority to control immigration—to admit or exclude
aliens—is vested solely in the Federal government.”).
32. See David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 Duke J.
Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 81, 118–27 (2013) (discussing the exclusivity principle and distin-
guishing it from the Court’s general preemption taxonomy). For critiques of the exclusivity
principle, see Huntington, supra note 17, who argues that the exclusivity principle has no firm R
basis in law or judicial precedent. See also Cristina M. Rodrı´guez, The Significance of the Local
in Immigration Regulation, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567 (2008) (arguing for a limited conception of
the exclusivity principle on functional grounds).
33. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
34. See, e.g., Chin & Miller, supra note 11, at 259–61, 263–64, 269 (defining “alienage R
regulation” in opposition to “immigration regulation”).
35. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
36. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010).
37. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. R
38. Cf. The Federalist No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided
between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among
distinct and separate departments. Hence, a double security arises to the rights of the
people.”).
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Fifth, and relatedly, the challenges facing Black-Box Immigration Feder-
alism do not reduce to generalized debates over formalism versus function-
alism.39 It almost goes without saying that constitutional formalists will
reject Black-Box Immigration Federalism because it blurs institutional pow-
ers and functions. But, as I suggest below, more forgiving functionalists
might also blink. Most functionalists, for example, accept sweeping delega-
tions of power along the separation-of-powers dimension, and yet may be
skeptical of power aggrandizement or the absence of sufficient checks on
federal power.40 Meanwhile, for issues of federalism, most functionalists
have little concern for state sovereignty per se.41 Still, however, functionalists
may worry about doctrines and arrangements that pay insufficient heed to
the instrumental values of federalism.42 Those well-known values include,
but are not limited to, checks on and competition with the federal govern-
ment, regulatory innovation, and staging grounds for participatory govern-
ment and national dialogue.43 If functionalism has limits, then Black-Box
Immigration Federalism tests them. As I will explain, this construct pro-
motes concentrations of largely unchecked federal power, which may upset
separation of powers, federalism, or both simultaneously. Thus, to shrug off
39. The literature on this debate is legion. For a good start, see, for example, Peter B.
McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitu-
tional Theory of the Second Best, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 8–9 (1994) (“[F]ormalism in the
separation of powers context involves the application of more or less rigid rules, rather than
flexible standards, to legal problems.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of
Separation Powers, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 225, 231 (“Where [formalists and functionalists] disa-
gree is over what sorts of deviations are permitted from the one function-one branch equa-
tion.”); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488–89, 517 (1987).
40. See Strauss, supra note 39, at 489, 517 (describing the functional approach as R
stressing the “core function and relationship” of the three branches of government, and sug-
gesting that questions of aggrandizement might be treated differently than questions of delega-
tion). That the nondelegation doctrine is notoriously underenforced is a familiar point made
by many. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 517 (2003).
41. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1499
(1994) (“[J]ust because it’s no longer possible to maintain a fixed domain of exclusive state
jurisdiction it’s not necessarily impossible to maintain a fluid one.”).
42. Federalism-functionalists frame questions around how power should be allocated be-
tween the federal and state governments and ask whether centralization or decentralization is
best for public outcomes. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 Fla. L.
Rev. 499, 539 (1995) (“[F]ederalism can be reconceived not as about limiting federal power or
even as about limiting state or local power. Rather, it should be seen as based on the desirabil-
ity of empowering multiple levels of government to deal with social problems.”).
43. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–59 (1991); Ernest A. Young, The Rehn-
quist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 53–63 (2004). But see Edward L. Rubin &
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 907–08
(1994) (“[F]ederalism in America achieves none of the beneficial goals that the Court claims
for it.”). For functional accounts of immigration federalism that recognize these and other
values, see Huntington, supra note 17. See also Rodrı´guez, supra note 32; Peter H. Schuck, R
Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 57; Peter J. Spiro, Learning to
Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1627 (1997).
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the discussion below as a formalist critique would miss the point—or, at
least it would miss mine.
Finally, before plunging into the merits, it bears emphasizing what has
already been accomplished: the black box has been opened. This Part con-
siders the first four propositions of Black-Box Immigration Federalism,
which are mostly structural. Part III considers the fifth proposition, which
more explicitly folds in constitutional rights.
A. Black Box—Proposition 1
Black-Box Immigration Federalism’s first proposition is that the federal
government is free to “choose” its lawmaking modes.44 That is partly true,
but only at a level of generality that elides important details about our struc-
tural Constitution. Under modern conceptions, each branch of the federal
government may have the capacity to make law. Critically, however, how
each branch does so remains circumscribed by a body of procedural law
spelled out in the Constitution and, as relevant here, under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA).45
These procedural limitations are foundational to both separation of
powers and federalism. For instance, Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution
prescribes how Congress makes law.46 Meanwhile, the executive branch gen-
erally can make law only pursuant to a valid congressional delegation, and
must otherwise comply with legislatively imposed procedural require-
ments.47 In turn, federal law made in violation of these substantive and pro-
cedural limitations cannot, a priori, preempt state law. The Supremacy
Clause says so: only “Laws . . . made in Pursuance [of the Constitution] . . .
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”48 If Congress or the executive branch
44. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. R
45. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).
46. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“[T]he
prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers’ decision that the
legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”).
47. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587–89 (1952)
(holding that the president has no inherent domestic lawmaking authority); see also 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-59 (providing, among other things, elaborate procedural scheme for administrative
rulemaking and adjudication).
48. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The “in Pursuance” term is generally
understood to mean that preemptive laws must be made in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 9–11 (2d ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1986) (1962). Cases from the early republic also suggest that “in Pursuance” entails
a substantive component that requires federal statutes be consistent with Congress’s powers.
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (asserting that the “made in
[p]ursuance” language excludes from supremacy acts of Congress that the Supreme Court
deems unconstitutional). But I am aware of no judicially backed conception—then or now—
that interprets “in Pursuance” to entail a substantive requirement to the exclusion of a proce-
dural one.
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makes law in a way that violates procedural or substantive limits, that law
cannot preempt state law.49
Further, how federal law is made has constitutional significance for
states and localities affected by that law. Administrative officials—unlike
members of Congress—are not politically beholden to states.50 And, even
when executive agencies make law, how they do so greatly affects the level of
access and potential influence that states and localities may have on the out-
come.51 All else equal, the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures provide
more of those participatory goods, as compared to when agencies forgo
those procedures.
Of course, Motomura knows these distinctions. But they are mostly ir-
relevant or outweighed by other considerations. Motomura’s reasons may
trace to his descriptive claims, in Chapters One and Three, that our dysfunc-
tional immigration system is a product of national design and acquiescence.
From that starting position, perhaps the federal government should be able
to choose its lawmaking mode—either to correct or continue past practices.
If that is the theory, however, then proposition 1 reflects or projects immi-
gration-specific norms. But it stands apart from mainstream tenets of feder-
alism and separation of powers. And, as I show below, these departures
magnify when refracted through propositions 2 through 4.
B. Black Box—Proposition 2
Under Black-Box Immigration Federalism’s second proposition, non-
binding executive policies qualify as federal law, at least for purposes of pre-
emption.52 This proposition may collapse on itself, inasmuch as it turns
49. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (“The relative importance to the State of
its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of
our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail.” (emphasis added)). And so the
question of validity must be answered in a preemption contest. See generally Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (explaining that a valid federal law can preempt a state
law).
50. Agencies are politically accountable—at most, and generally only in theory—
through the President. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865 (1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Execu-
tive is . . . .”). But cf. Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How
Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779, 803
(2010) (questioning the extent to which agencies are actually held accountable). In any event,
the President’s constituency is national (not regional) in scope.
51. See David S. Rubenstein, Administrative Federalism as Separation of Powers, 72 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 171, 229–30 (2015); Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administra-
tive Process, 100 Va. L. Rev. 953, 970–79 (2014); see also Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of
Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 Am. U. L.
Rev. 1183, 1227–37 (2015) (arguing that the deliberation behind DAPA would have benefited
from notice-and-comment procedures); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability:
“Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 Duke L.J. 2125, 2129 (2009) (arguing that increased state in-
volvement in agency regulation could affect preemption rulemakings).
52. See sources cited supra note 27. R
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nonbinding federal action into law. Granted, law is a capacious jurispruden-
tial term.53 But any theory that operationalizes nonlaw into law must explain
away the lawmaking procedures, divisions of power, and checks-and-bal-
ances prescribed in the Constitution.
Moreover, proposition 2’s conversion of nonbinding federal action into
binding law invites the type of agency gamesmanship that administrative law
generally disfavors.54 Specifically, if agencies could have their policies treated
as binding law without the hassle and delay of notice-and-comment proce-
dures, the incentive structure for agencies to select that form of policymak-
ing may be seriously compromised.55
Proposition 2 also raises fundamental questions about scope. Motomura
lays no outer bounds on what qualifies as “federal law” within the exceed-
ingly vast domain of nonbinding agency action. We are only told that federal
enforcement policies should be included. Still, even that is an unwieldy do-
main. On Motomura’s account, a memorandum from the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) secretary clearly qualifies as federal law. So would
a memorandum from non-cabinet-level agency heads such as the director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. For example, the enforcement
memoranda in effect during the Arizona v. United States litigation were
signed by non-cabinet-level agency heads and were self-referentially non-
binding against the agency.56 And yet, it was these same memoranda that
53. See John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 51/2 Myths, 46 Am. J. Juris. 199, 223–24 (2001)
(canvassing some of the literature on the age-old question—“What is law?”).
54. On agency gamesmanship, see Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regu-
latory Reform, 1985 Duke L.J. 381, 390, who notes that “an agency might manipulate its
description [of whether a rule is legislative or not] in order to avoid pre-enforcement judicial
review, keep a low profile, or circumvent cumbersome notice and comment requirements,
while achieving the desired change in staff and private party behavior” (footnotes omitted); see
also David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120
Yale L.J. 276, 280 (2010) (“[A]gencies cannot have their cake and eat it too by sidestepping
expensive public input at the promulgation stage while also counting on lenient substantive
review from courts at the enforcement stage.”).
55. See Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 Ad-
min. L. Rev. 565–66, 592–93 (2012) (explaining that the USCIS prefers to avoid notice-and-
comment procedures and instead uses guidance documents for immigration policies); Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 547,
553–55 (2000) (“[T]he agency has an incentive to mischaracterize a legislative rule as interpre-
tative to circumvent the APA rulemaking procedure.”); cf. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135
S. Ct. 1199, 1203–04 (2015) (noting that interpretive rules that forgo notice-and-comment are
convenient for agencies but lack the force of law).
56. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t,
to All Field Office Dirs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Re-
moval of Aliens 6 (June 17, 2011), http:// www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/
prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [http://perma.cc/WPZ8-EC94] (“[T]his memorandum,
which may be modified, superseded, or rescinded at any time without notice, is not intended
to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedu-
ral, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.”).
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ostensibly had preemptive bearing on at least one, and maybe two, of the
state laws at issue in Arizona.57
Under Motomura’s account, even a non-cabinet-level policy directive
that is routinely disregarded by rank-and-file federal officers can have pre-
emptive effect. This requires some piecing together. In 2012, Secretary of
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued the Deferred Action for Child-
hood Arrivals (DACA) memorandum, which, among other things, reified
pre-existing enforcement policies that deprioritized the removal of young
undocumented immigrants.58 The secretary’s memorandum was publicly
backed by President Obama, and some say necessary, because rank-and-file
federal agents were neglecting (often purposefully, and chronically) the pre-
existing directives of non-cabinet-level supervisors.59 If that is so, however,
then the enforcement memoranda in effect during the Arizona litigation
were neither Congress’s law on the books nor the law in action.60  Still,
Motomura’s view is that macro-level executive policies honored in the
breach have preemptive effect.
Motomura’s elastic conception of federal law may make sense for immi-
gration; indeed, many immigration scholars seem to share this view, at least
as pertains to striking down restrictionist state and local laws. But, again,
this conception arguably departs from mainstream constitutional and ad-
ministrative law norms. To my mind, that raises important questions about
whether this particular departure is warranted in general, and whether
Motomura and others would still support this conception if operationalized
to preempt state and local integrationist laws.
57. See Rubenstein, supra note 32, at 112–14 (discussing the role that enforcement dis- R
cretion played, and did not play, in the government’s briefing and the Court’s preemption
analysis). For another perspective on how executive enforcement policies were treated in Ari-
zona, and what the Court’s decision may portend, see Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy
and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 31. To be sure, the noncabinet memo-
randa at issue may have been made in consultation with or instigated by the secretary of
Homeland Security and with the President’s approval. But that does not seem to be a precon-
dition for Motomura. In any event, as the Court held in Medell´ın v. Texas, even a memoran-
dum signed by the President is not a sufficient basis alone to preempt state law. 552 U.S. 491,
530–32 (2008).
58. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Agui-
lar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children 2 (June 15, 2012),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-
came-to-us-as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/P39C-V6EL] [hereinafter DACA Memo].
59. Pp. 204–05 (“[The memos that pre-dated DACA] failed to have much consistent and
uniform influence on enforcement activities in the field . . . [as] rank-and-file ICE officers
resisted implementation of the . . . memos, and members of their union adopted a vote of no-
confidence in ICE director John Morton and one of his chief deputies.”); see also Adam B. Cox
& Cristina M. Rodrı´guez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 Yale L.J. 104, 187–90
(2015) (elaborating that ICE director Morton’s memos had no significant impact on agents’
prosecutorial discretion to arrest immigrants).
60. The DACA Memo, supra note 58, was issued after oral argument and while the R
Court’s decision in Arizona was pending.
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C. Black Box—Proposition 3
Under Black-Box Immigration Federalism’s third proposition, federal
law in action would take presumptive (but defeasible) precedence over Con-
gress’s laws, at least for purposes of preemption (pp. 121, 123–24). This is
an extension of proposition 2, although not a necessary one. Whereas pro-
position 2 treats nonbinding executive policies as federal law, proposition 3
mediates potential conflicts between Congress and the executive branch
when questions arise over what the federal law is. Motomura allows for a
congressional override of executive policy, thus recognizing Congress’s for-
mal power vis-a`-vis the executive (p. 151). Critically, however, proposition 3
places the political burden on Congress to overcome executive policies.
Thus, as a practical matter, unless Congress clearly precludes or overrides
executive enforcement policies, the executive policies are good law. Any
doubts about executive authorization—as is the case, for example, with pro-
grams like DACA and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA)61—
are resolved in favor of the executive for federalism purposes, if not also for
separation of powers.62
This move arguably inverts the conventional lawmaking relationship be-
tween Congress and the executive. For constitutional purposes, and with few
exceptions, Congress’s laws reign supreme over administrative policies in
domestic affairs,63 including in immigration.64 Under proposition 3, how-
ever, Congress must effectively veto the President, rather than the other way
around. Needless to say, in a political climate where passing any law is ex-
ceedingly difficult, shifting the political burden can be dispositive, especially
when conjoined with the President’s formal veto power. DACA and DAPA
61. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leo´n
Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discre-
tion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect
to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20,
2014) [hereinafter DAPA Memo], http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/9N36-2NBX].
62. Cf. Hiroshi Motomura, The President’s Dilemma: Executive Authority, Enforcement,
and the Rule of Law in Immigration Law, 55 Washburn L.J. 1 (2016) (defending DAPA and
DACA on rule-of-law grounds, apart from the preemption context).
63. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1952) (“In
the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”); see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.
EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014) (“The power of executing the laws necessarily includes both
authority and responsibility to resolve some questions left open by Congress that arise during
the law’s administration. But it does not include a power to revise clear statutory terms that
turn out not to work in practice.”).
64. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodrı´guez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
Yale L.J. 458, 476–78 (2009) (noting the Court’s “evolution toward more mainstream concep-
tions” of the lawmaking relationship between Congress and the President in immigration be-
ginning in the latter half of the twentieth century).
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are cases in point. Some defenders of these programs claim that the Presi-
dent is not substituting for Congress, or aggrandizing the legislative func-
tion, because Congress can override these executive actions.65 While this line
of defense is formally true, it is functionally false: any attempted statutory
override will face an executive veto. Indeed, President Obama has already
said so.66
Again, perhaps proposition 3 may be defended on immigration-specific
grounds and rooted in Motomura’s descriptive claim that Congress (or the
nation more generally) does not intend for the executive’s zealous enforce-
ment of the immigration law on the books.67 Still, however, the question
remains: How much constitutional significance should we lend this descrip-
tive account? If the wink-and-nod lawmaking pathology that Motomura de-
scribes is desirable, then perhaps the Constitution should bend to
accommodate those dynamics. But Motomura surely does not condone the
lawmaking pathology he describes, inasmuch as it enables arbitrary govern-
ment action and threatens the rule of law.68
Alternatively, if proposition 3 is doctrinally meant to compensate for
federal wink-and-nod lawmaking, we should not lose sight of the ways the
system might further recede. More specifically, if Congress already passes
restrictionist laws with the expectation of executive underenforcement, then
proposition 3 might exacerbate this moral hazard. That is, Congress may
pass even more restrictive immigration laws, hoping or anticipating—but by
no means guaranteeing—that the executive will modulate any excesses. Iron-
ically, if not counterproductively, proposition 3 would simply give more dis-
cretionary power and scope to the executive branch, while making it harder
for Congress and the courts to curb any abuses. Of course, we can envision a
dutiful executive branch channeling its newfound power for “good.” But,
critically, nothing in proposition 3 defines good, much less ensures it.
65. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation
on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/re
marks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/MCK9-LHJQ] (“And to those
members of Congress who question my authority to make our immigration system work bet-
ter, or question the wisdom of me acting where Congress has failed, I have one answer: Pass a
bill. I want to work with both parties to pass a more permanent legislative solution. And the
day I sign that bill into law, the actions I take will no longer be necessary.”).
66. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address
(Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-
state-union-address-january-20-2015 [http://perma.cc/YS26-53QY]; see also Elise Foley, House
GOP Votes to Block Protections for Undocumented Immigrants, Huffington Post (Jan. 15,
2015, 12:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/14/house-republicans-dhs-immi
gration_n_6470288.html [http://perma.cc/837U-EBLR] (reporting that the White House “is-
sued a formal veto threat [against] . . . anything that goes against [its] executive actions on
immigration”).
67. This descriptive claim has important parallels to what Adam Cox and Cristina Rodrı´-
guez describe as “de facto delegation.” See Cox & Rodrı´guez, supra note 64, at 510–11 (“[D]e R
facto delegation is driven by legal rules that make a huge fraction of resident noncitizens
deportable at the option of the executive.”). For an updated account of their views, see Cox &
Rodrı´guez, supra note 59. R
68. See pp. 186, 204–06.
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Finally, even assuming arguendo that the executive branch has wide
berth to make immigration policy, that does not independently resolve the
federalism question of whether the law in action (as opposed to the law on
the books) may have preemptive effect. Congress may be deemed to con-
structively consent to executive branch enforcement policies. Still, whether
and how those separation-of-powers dynamics should be imposed on non-
consenting states is an entirely different question, to which I now turn.
D. Black Box—Proposition 4
Under Black-Box Immigration Federalism’s fourth proposition, execu-
tive enforcement policies that are not binding for purposes of separation-of-
powers and individual-rights claims can nevertheless be binding on states
and localities.69 To help isolate this move from the others, assume proposi-
tions 1 through 3. Specifically, assume that the federal government is free to
choose its mode of immigration regulation; assume that nonbinding federal
policies can qualify as law; and assume that absent a clear conflict between
the law on the books and executive enforcement policies, the latter controls.
Still missing, however, is the conceptually distinct move that would impose
these federal dynamics on nonconsenting states. It is in this transition that
any missteps and close calls over separation of powers get effectively laun-
dered across the structural divide into federalism.
To begin, proposition 4 may run headlong into a constitutional para-
dox.70 More specifically, if executive enforcement policies qualify as “law,”
then those policies arguably violate separation of powers (and, for that rea-
son, are ineligible to preempt state law).71 Meanwhile, if executive action
does not qualify as “law” (thus avoiding a separation-of-powers problem),
then the action arguably falls beyond the Supremacy Clause’s purview of
“Laws made in Pursuance [of the Constitution].”72 Proposition 4, however,
requires that executive action qualify as law for purposes of federalism, yet
simultaneously qualify as not law for separation of powers.
Moreover, proposition 4 elides distinctions between choice-of-law rules
that apply to federalism and separation of powers. Justice Jackson’s famous
concurrence in Youngstown, for example, provides a leading test for resolv-
ing potential conflicts between congressional and presidential power.73 But,
69. See pp. 123, 126.
70. For more on this paradox, see Rubenstein, supra note 12 (framing the paradox and R
assessing it through textual, structural, historical, doctrinal and pragmatic lenses).
71. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (vesting “All legislative Powers” in Congress); City of
Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 n.4 (2013) (“Agencies make rules . . . [that] take
‘legislative’ . . . . forms, but they are exercises of—indeed, under our constitutional structure
they must be exercises of—the ‘executive Power.’ ” (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1));
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“[Article I] permits no delegation
of [legislative] powers . . . .”).
72. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
73. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
For accounts of whether DAPA and DACA violate separation of powers under Youngstown’s
three-tiered analysis, compare Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIC\114-6\MIC608.txt unknown Seq: 18 22-APR-16 14:44
1000 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:983
whatever indeterminacy inheres along the separation-of-powers dimension,
federalism has its own choice-of-law rule. It is enshrined in the Supremacy
Clause, and provides in relevant part: “This [1] Constitution, and [2] the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and [3]
all Treaties made . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”74
Notice what the Supremacy Clause does not provide: it does not say that
“federal law” is the supreme law of the land. Rather, by design, the
Supremacy Clause provides that certain federal laws—the Constitution,
“Laws . . . made in Pursuance” of the Constitution, and treaties—are su-
preme over state law.75 I have written at length elsewhere about the import
of this qualifying language for both federalism and separation of powers.76
For present purposes, however, my point is more confined: the Supremacy
Clause makes the quality and type of federal law centrally relevant to feder-
alism, even if these features of federal law are not relevant to separation of
powers.
Put otherwise, even if the law in action functionally trumps the law on
the books for purposes of separation of powers, something more is required
to impose that arrangement on states and local governments. Proposition 4
siphons federal law (broadly conceived) into the states without taking cogni-
zance of the move itself, much less its constitutional significance. The so-
called “political safeguards of federalism,”77 for example, rely heavily on
states’ ability to protect their interests in Congress, both substantively and
in the Absence of Immigration Reform, 116 W. Va. L. Rev. 255, 279 (2013), which notes that
“DACA . . . falls within Justice Jackson’s twilight zone, which allows the President to act in
cases of ‘congressional inertia, indifference, or quiescence,’ particularly where Congress and
the executive enjoy concurrent authority,” (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring))), with Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing
the Law, 19 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 213, 267 (2015), which observes that “DAPA is a perfect storm
of executive lawmaking, descending to the lowest depths of Youngstown, beyond the ‘zone of
twilight,’ and even below the ‘lowest ebb, ” and Margulies, supra note 51, at 1252–55  who R
argues that DAPA falls into Youngstown’s third-tier, and is unconstitutional.
74. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88
Geo. L.J. 2085, 2088 (2000) (describing the Supremacy Clause as a “constitutional choice of
law rule”).
75. See Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 No-
tre Dame L. Rev. 1421, 1422–23 (2008); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safe-
guard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1321, 1328–72 (2001); Michael D. Ramsey, The Supremacy
Clause, Original Meaning, and Modern Law, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 559, 575–78 (2013). The import
of this constitutional text, however, is subject to debate, including with respect to administra-
tive preemption in particular. See Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 276–97 (canvassing the litera- R
ture and doctrine).
76. See David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1125 (2012); Ru-
benstein, supra note 12. R
77. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543
(1954).
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procedurally.78 Legislative gridlock is a feature of that political representa-
tion, especially as it relates to subjects as hotly contested as immigration, on
which there is no national consensus.79 These political and procedural safe-
guards, however, have little or no traction in the administrative forum.
To be sure, other safeguards may be administratively available. Some
commentators believe, for example, that administrative notice-and-com-
ment procedures provide a sufficient (even if not optimal) proxy for the
political and procedural safeguards of federalism in Congress.80 But, criti-
cally, these administrative safeguards are neutered when agencies bypass no-
tice-and-comment procedures. Indeed, for that reason, most commentators
who have addressed the issue suggest that agency policies must first undergo
notice and comment, or otherwise have the “force of law,” before these poli-
cies may have preemptive effect.81 Executive enforcement policies, in the
form of nonenforcement or memoranda directives, are simply not of that
class. Indisputably, enforcement policies are a necessary component of fed-
eral immigration regulation. But that is a reason for the executive to have
enforcement policies, not a stand-alone reason why states and localities must
be bound by those policies.82
Again, the concerns are not only, or even mostly, formalistic. On func-
tional grounds, notice-and-comment rulemaking generally offers greater ac-
countability, deliberation, and congressional and judicial oversight of
78. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547–56 (1985) (citing
Wechsler, supra note 77); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. R
1349 (2001); see also Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 315–18 (arguing that the Court’s political- R
safeguards theory is a type of “super-dicta” on which the legitimacy of the Court’s modern
federalism jurisprudence depends).
79. If anything, the state consensus may run against the executive’s enforcement policy,
given that more than half of states sued to enjoin the executive’s DAPA program. See Texas v.
United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257, (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016)
(No. 15-674).
80. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 Duke L.J. 1933, 2010–12 (2008);
Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023 (2008);
Sharkey, supra note 51, at 2127–28 (claiming that “federal agencies . . . surprisingly emerge as R
the best possible protectors of state regulatory interests” and suggesting that agencies be “re-
form[ed] . . . to ensure they can become a rich forum for participation by state governmental
entities”).
81. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 80, at 2010–12; Scott A. Keller, How Courts Can R
Protect State Autonomy from Federal Administrative Encroachment, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 45, 73–94
(2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727,
761–65 (2008); Rubenstein, supra note 32, at 129–30; Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, R
102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 869, 897–900 (2008). But cf. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 91
(2008) (expressly leaving open the question of whether an agency’s policy without the force of
law can have preemptive effect); Kim, supra note 11, at 719–32 (arguing that under certain R
circumstances nonbinding immigration enforcement policies should have preemptive effect);
supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting that the Court’s Arizona decision sent mixed R
signals on this issue).
82. But cf. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (blurring past this
distinction).
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administrative action.83 These instrumental values may not be sufficient for
federalism formalists. But, for formalists and functionalists alike, these val-
ues may be necessary to impose the executive’s will on nonconsenting states
and localities. Of course, the executive branch may choose to be relatively
transparent about its enforcement policies, as it has with the DACA and
DAPA programs. But proposition 4 does not draw distinctions (though, per-
haps it should) between executive policies that are announced in the Rose
Garden and those that are not.
Finally, proposition 4 misses a functional possibility: preemption doc-
trine might be leveraged to check—rather than channel—any separation-of-
powers slippage and dysfunctional federal lawmaking. After all, overlapping
safeguards of liberty is a key design feature of the Constitution.84 If one
safeguard fails (say, along the separation-of-powers dimension), another
may yet survive (say, along the federalism dimension). Again, this claim does
not insist on any particular theory of separation of powers or federalism,
much less a formalistic one.85 My point is only that relaxing separation of
powers, as propositions 1 through 3 contemplate, is not a reason to relax
federalism.
Indeed, a good case can be made for the opposite. More specifically, we
might insist on the power-checking functions of federalism to compensate
for dubious lawmaking pathologies or errant federal policies. As I have ex-
plained in more detail elsewhere, foreclosing the preemptive effect of non-
binding executive policies can, cross-structurally, nudge the political process
toward transparency, deliberation, stability, and other values along the sepa-
ration-of-powers dimension.86 Incidentally, these are the same values that
83. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking,
and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 Duke L.J. 377, 406–07 (2006) (discussing
transparency and deliberation as factors that increase agency accountability); Metzger, supra
note 80, at 2087 (“[B]y forcing an agency to provide notice of actions it plans to take, procedu- R
ral requirements empower congressional oversight and thus reinforce such political safeguards
as Congress has to offer”); Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal Regulatory
Preemption of State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 611, 647 (2010) (noting that notice
and comment permits interested parties to inform Congress if the rulemaking proceedings
conflict with their interests).
84. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (explaining how separation of federal power, on the one hand, and separation of federal
and state power, on the other, could offer a “double security” of liberty).
85. See Rubenstein, supra note 51, at 179–208 (surveying “structural pluralism,” which R
contains myriad theories of “separation(s) of powers” and “federalism(s),” and no clear win-
ners among them).
86. Some of the discussion that follows draws from my earlier work. See Rubenstein,
supra note 32; Rubenstein, supra note 51. For treatments of how federalism can safeguard R
separation of powers in other contexts, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of
the Separation of Powers, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 459, 503 (2012) which explores this idea for
cooperative federalism schemes, and Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Con-
text, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 181, 185–86 (1998), which does the same. See also Brannon P.
Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive
Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 825, 829–30 (2004) (exploring this idea
for foreign affairs federalism).
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Motomura prizes, albeit under a rule-of-law heading, in support of categori-
cal grants of legal reprieve to undocumented immigrants.87 My functional
suggestion is complementary, but would advance these separation-of-powers
(or rule-of-law) values differently, and arguably better, at least when the
executive branch prefers a uniform policy shielded from a patchwork of sub-
federal resistance. Recall that under proposition 4, an executive official can
write a memorandum to preempt subfederal resistance to federal enforce-
ment policies.88 Yet if proposition 4 is foreclosed, as I suggest, the executive
branch would either have to achieve the same preemptive policy through
Congress or via notice-and-comment procedures. Either of these lawmaking
alternatives would provide more deliberation, more transparency, and more
stability than if an executive official can sign a memorandum, shut down
state resistance though preemption along federalism dimensions,89 and then
seek to dismiss any separation-of-powers challenges on the ground that no
one has standing to bring them.90
Before proceeding, let me be clear about my claims. I am not claiming
that categorical programs like DACA and DAPA are bad policy. And I agree
with Motomura that relative to a system of case-by-case, ad hoc, executive
decisionmaking, categorical exercises of prosecutorial discretion can offer
greater doses of transparency, deliberation, and stability.91 My point, how-
ever, is that we might do better: scrapping proposition 4 from the playbook
could nudge the executive branch to notice-and-comment rulemaking or
legislative solutions, in contexts—like DACA and DAPA—when the execu-
tive wants uniform federal policies free from subfederal interference.
In sum, even assuming that “the federal choice of one kind of decision-
making process over another is part of federal authority over immigration”
(p. 123; emphasis added), the policy emerging from that procedural choice
need not have preemptive effect.92 A valid congressional statute clearly has
preemptive effect. So too would an administrative regulation promulgated
87. See p. 207.
88. See pp. 123, 126; see also supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. R
89. Cf. United States’ Brief as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Rehearing En Banc at 8,
Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-16248) (arguing that
Arizona’s denial of driver’s licenses to DACA recipients is preempted by federal enforcement
authority).
90. Cf. Brief for the Federal Appellees at 21–22, Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th
Cir. 2015) (arguing that states lack standing to challenge DAPA program), cert. granted, 2016
WL 207257, (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-674); Brief of Professor Ernest A. Young as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Appellees at 23, Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (“The United States’
position in this case is not an attempt to identify the best possible plaintiff to challenge the
DAPA, but rather to ensure that no litigant may challenge the President’s unilateral assertion of
power.”).
91. See pp. 204–05.
92. Cf. Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 321 (“If there is a reason for the conceptual leap R
from delegation to preemption, it does not come from the nondelegation doctrine. Indeed, if
anything, preemption would seem repelled by that doctrine’s core principle—namely, that
Congress cannot lawfully delegate its lawmaking power.”).
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pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures.93 In both events, the federal
policy has the force of law upon inception and is thus binding on states and
localities regardless of their consent. Nonbinding executive enforcement pol-
icies are an entirely different breed.
***
As the foregoing hopes to lay bare, Black-Box Immigration Federalism’s
simple preemption formula is not so simple. It may be true, or perhaps it
should be true, that “federal law” preempts conflicting state and local law (p.
7). But the devil is in the details. Black-Box Immigration Federalism elides
those details—such as what qualifies as federal law, who makes it, and how.
Moreover, Black-Box Immigration Federalism embeds a number of norma-
tive choices that may, on balance, prove dangerous. Among other concerns,
this exceptional constitutional construct permits the executive branch to
functionally relax Congress’s laws and to formally trump subfederal jurisdic-
tions. That consolidation of executive power may be efficient and conve-
nient. Yet it arguably does so in ways that the Constitution does not, and
should not, countenance.
E. The Problem of Preemption Symmetry
I now turn to an additional problem that Black-Box Immigration Feder-
alism poses for immigrant advocates: preemption symmetry. The more ca-
paciously “federal law” is defined, the more possible it becomes that
subfederal restrictionist and integrationist measures can be preempted. Most
notably, the executive branch can adopt or promote federal restrictionist pol-
icies that preempt subfederal integrationist policies.94 This is no chimerical
prospect. Even the current administration, which has been quite generous to
certain immigrants,95 has demonstrated its propensity not to be. Apart from
93. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that an agency
regulation preempted a state tort law claim); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658,
675 (1993) (same).
94. Of course, downward preemption symmetry is not a problem if the intention is to
shut down restrictionist and integrationist measures. But Motomura is refreshingly candid
about his integrationist-only preference. See, e.g., pp. 152–53, 163–64. Indeed, the arc of his
book arguably depends on it.
95. DACA and DAPA, combined, potentially reach about 50 percent of our estimated
11.4 million undocumented population. Press Release, Migration Policy Inst., As Many as 3.7
Million Unauthorized Immigrants Could Get Relief from Deportation Under Anticipated New
Deferred Action Program (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-many-
37-million-unauthorized-immigrants-could-get-relief-deportation-under-anticipated-new
[http://perma.cc/7UUK-FHYN] (“[T]he anticipated new deferred action program and ex-
panded DACA initiative could benefit as many as 5.2 million people—nearly half of the 11.4
million unauthorized immigrants living in the United States.”); see also Simpson & Morrison,
supra note 2 (noting that almost 5 million unauthorized immigrants might be eligible for relief R
under President Obama’s executive orders).
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removing exponentially more immigrants than any preceding one,96 the
Obama administration’s unilateral expansion of Secure Communities effec-
tively mooted state and local non-cooperation laws.97 Moreover, when Illi-
nois tried to limit the use of the federal E-Verify system to check
employment authorization, the Obama administration took the extraordi-
nary step of suing, successfully it turns out, to preempt that state law.98 And,
when the California Supreme Court was considering whether to admit an
undocumented immigrant to the state bar, the Obama administration filed
an amicus brief arguing that the state court had no power to do so.99
Consider what a less immigrant-friendly administration might accom-
plish, enabled and encouraged by Black-Box Immigration Federalism.
Trending integrationist measures like California’s TRUST Act, subfederal
sanctuary laws throughout the country, and New York’s contemplated state-
citizenship bill, may become targets of federal preemption.100 I take no posi-
tion here on whether these and other integrationist initiatives can survive
preemption challenges under existing federal statutes and mainstream feder-
alism doctrines. For present purposes, the point for consideration is that
Black-Box Immigration Federalism opens a new legal front: preemption by
executive fiat. Certainly, there is no shortage of legal or political reasons that
a sufficiently motivated executive might offer to preempt integrationist laws.
Just to name a few, administrators might claim that subfederal integration
programs interfere with a federal statute, interfere with (new) enforcement
96. Barack Obama, Deporter-in-Chief, The Economist (Feb. 8, 2014), http://
www.economist.com/news/leaders/21595902-expelling-record-numbers-immigrants-costly-
way-make-america-less-dynamic-barack-obama [http://perma.cc/R3AF-BC9Y] (“America is
expelling illegal immigrants at nine times the rate of 20 years ago[,] nearly 2 [million] so far
under Barack Obama, easily outpacing any previous president.” (citation omitted)). Contra
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 109 n.118 (5th Cir. 2015) (suggesting that the comparative
statistics can be misleading and that when “returns” are accounted for in addition to “remov-
als,” the “total number of deportations is at its lowest level since the mid-1970’s [sic] (citing
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2013 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 103 tbl.39
(2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_yb_2013_0.pdf)), cert. granted,
2016 WL 207257, (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-674).
97. See Cox & Rodrı´guez, supra note 59, at 137 (“Secure Communities promised to dis- R
place the unpredictable human element of formal and informal cooperation with local po-
lice.”). But cf. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that federal detainer
requests directed at state and local officials to maintain custody over potentially deportable
immigrants must be construed, and treated by subfederal officials, as a non-mandatory
request).
98. See United States v. Illinois, No. 07-3261, 2009 WL 662703 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2009).
99. See Application and Proposed Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States of America,
In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (2014) (No. S202512), 2012 WL 3822246.
100. Cf. Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative
of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 247 (2012) (discussing sub-
federal sanctuary laws and defending them on normative and constitutional grounds); Peter L.
Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 869
(2015) (same for New York’s contemplated state citizenship law); Rosenbaum, supra note 11 R
(same for California TRUST Act).
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priorities, unduly incentivize unlawful migration to the country, and/or re-
duce incentives for undocumented immigrants to voluntarily depart.
Thus far, what has saved some integrationist measures from challenge is
the absence of a plaintiff with standing to sue.101 That jurisprudential bar,
however, would not prevent the federal government from suing (as it did in
Illinois to preempt an integrationist law), or enticing states and localities to
forgo integrationist measures in exchange for federal funding or other forms
of federal assistance. Of course, political forces might temper these possibili-
ties. For example, politics might be a reason for the executive branch not to
seek preemption of subfederal integrationist laws. But politics is not a limit-
ing principle that immigrant advocates should rush to, especially if it is the
only limiting principle. After all, politics has not prevented past administra-
tions from taking hard-nosed (not to mention, rights-depriving) actions
against undocumented immigrants.102 Indeed, politics is often to blame for
these incursions, and it will be the cause of future ones.
III. Black Box—Proposition 5: Dealing with Preemption
Symmetry
As explained above, the more capaciously that “federal law” is defined,
the more possible it becomes that state and local laws will preemptively con-
flict with the law on the books or the law in action. But a symmetrically
robust preemption doctrine that treats restrictionist and integrationist laws
with equal hostility presents a structural dilemma for Motomura: without
Congress, and without state and local integration efforts, Motomura’s vision
of undocumented immigrants as Americans in waiting cannot be realized. It
is with this challenge in mind that Motomura suggests importing an equality
norm into immigration preemption analysis.103 I call this proposed doctrine
“Equal Pro-Emption,” to capture its hybrid composition.
Under Equal Pro-Emption, courts would take an especially skeptical ap-
proach to restrictionist laws; and, because this doctrine would not apply to
integrationist laws, it might help to ratchet Black-Box Immigration Federal-
ism toward subfederal integration of undocumented immigrants. More spe-
cifically, under Motomura’s proposed Equal Pro-Emption doctrine, federal
law would trump restrictionist laws unless the state or locality can demon-
strate that its law does not purposefully discriminate and will not have a
101. See, e.g., Day v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1033–34 (D. Kan. 2005) (holding that
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Kansas’s in-state tuition law for undocumented immi-
grants), aff’d sub nom. Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007).
102. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 635–36 (providing examples, “including ‘repatriation’ R
of persons of Mexican ancestry . . . during the Great Depression, deportations of communist
party members during the McCarthy era, exploitation of Mexican workers through the
Bracero Program, the mass arrests, detentions, and removals of Muslim and Arab noncitizens
after the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the raids, detention, and removal of noncitizens
in contemporary times”).
103. See pp. 134–35.
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discriminatory effect (p.135). By design, this restructuring inverts the consti-
tutional burden of proof: “plaintiffs would no longer need to prove that state
and local governments intend to discriminate, as an equal protection chal-
lenge would require to succeed. Instead, preemption analysis would require
state and local governments to allay concerns about allowing them to en-
force immigration law” (p. 135).
With Motomura leading the charge, other prominent commentators
have also ascribed to something like Equal Pro-Emption.104 So, this is a
vogue idea. As I will explain, however, Equal Pro-Emption is at best an un-
derinclusive solution to the problem of preemption symmetry. And, absent
judicial buy-in, it is no solution at all. Certainly, Motomura offers no
shortage of reasons why the Supreme Court should adopt an Equal Pro-
Emption doctrine. Foremost, he worries that state and local officials may
enforce immigration laws in discriminatory ways that go undetected and
difficult to prove under the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.105 Ab-
sent from Motomura’s account, however, is an assessment of whether the
Court is likely to adopt an Equal Pro-Emption doctrine. I offer that skepti-
cism here. Without Equal Pro-Emption, there is yet no alternative theory to
save integrationist measures from the vortex of Black-Box Immigration Fed-
eralism. And, under that skeptical scenario, Black-Box Immigration Federal-
ism might undermine the ends of wide-scale integration.
A. Constitutional Hurdles
As a constitutional matter, Equal Pro-Emption must overcome or side-
step a trifecta of rights, federalism, and separation-of-powers jurisprudence
of the Court’s own creation. First, Equal Pro-Emption circumvents the
Court’s general requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate a discriminatory
purpose, not merely a discriminatory impact, when challenging facially neu-
tral laws under the Equal Protection Clause.106 The Court deliberately de-
signed the discriminatory-purpose standard to be difficult to meet.107
Motomura acknowledges this, and explains that importing an equality norm
into preemption analysis can turn “a losing equal protection . . . challenge”
into “a winning preemption challenge” (p. 135). Indeed, avoiding the
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence seems to be the sine qua non of
Equal Pro-Emption.108
To take root, therefore, Equal Pro-Emption will require the Court either
to jettison the discriminatory-purpose standard across the board or carve an
104. See sources cited supra note 11. R
105. See pp. 134–35.
106. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also Reva B. Siegel, Equality Di-
vided, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 16–17 (2013).
107. See Ian Haney-Lo´pez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1779, 1847 (2012);
Siegel, supra note 106, at 15–20. R
108. See pp. 133–35.
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exception for immigration federalism.109 Neither scenario is likely under cur-
rent conditions. To be sure, the Court’s discriminatory-purpose requirement
may be ill conceived, as any number of prominent theorists have long at-
tested.110 Moreover, there is no denying here that undocumented immigrants
experience discriminatory impact.111 The unfortunate reality, however, is
that countless others in our society do too—in drug enforcement, death-
penalty cases, and many other contexts. Yet the Court has shown no signs of
retreating from its discriminatory-purpose standard, which makes it doubt-
ful that the Court will give immigration enforcement special constitutional
treatment in this regard.
The Court’s discriminatory-purpose standard also has links to federal-
ism, and for reasons that Equal Pro-Emption must also overcome. In the
progenitor case of Washington v. Davis, the Court waxed profusely about
institutional considerations, objecting to the far reaching consequences that
a disparate-impact standard would have on a swath of state and local laws.112
Equal Pro-Emption, if adopted, would effectively invert this judicial solici-
tude for representative government. Rather than give subfederal officials the
benefit of the doubt, the Court would doctrinally presume that subfederal
officials might violate constitutional rights, and thus deny these officials the
opportunity to enforce the law. That judicial hubris is conceivable, but,
again, unlikely from the sitting Court. If anything, the Court’s recent juris-
prudence—including on voting rights, the war on drugs, and immigration
in particular—suggests that the Court is not willing to presume rights viola-
tions by state and local officials.113 Closest to home on this point is the Ari-
zona Court’s denial of the federal government’s facial preemption challenge
109. In theory, Equal Pro-Emption might provide a third option, between the binary dis-
criminatory purpose and discriminatory-impact standards. But, in practice, it is not clear what
work the discriminatory purpose test would do if plaintiffs could simply have the government
acts enjoined under Motomura’s proposed Equal Pro-Emption standard.
110. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, in Critical Race Theory 235, 237 (Kimberle´ Crenshaw et al. eds.,
1995); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1144–45 (1997); David A. Strauss, Discrimina-
tory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935, 939 (1989). And, for critiques of
the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence as applied to aliens in particular, see Jason H. Lee,
Unlawful Status as a “Constitutional Irrelevancy”?: The Equal Protection Rights of Illegal Immi-
grants, 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 1 (2008), and Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws:
Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA
L. Rev. 1425 (1995).
111. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration En-
forcement, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 675, 688–716 (2000) (documenting prevalent claims of racial
profiling in immigration enforcement).
112. 426 U.S. 229, 245–48 (1976).
113. Cf. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down the coverage
formula of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2344
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Although many observers viewed the 100-to-1 crack-to-powder
ratio under the prior law as having a racially disparate impact, only intentional discrimination
may violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”
(citation omitted)); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509–10 (2012) (declining to
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to the state’s “show-me-your-papers” law114—a law that requires state and
local officers conducting stop, detention, or arrests to verify a person’s im-
migration status with federal agents if “reasonable suspicion exists that the
person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.”115 In up-
holding that provision, the Court did not assume rights violations. In fact, it
did just the opposite: it took a wait-and-see approach.116
Through a federalism lens, then, Equal Pro-Emption may be both over-
inclusive and underinclusive. More specifically, it might be overinclusive in-
sofar as it prophylactically preempts state and local officials who may not be
discriminating in immigration enforcement. At the same time, Equal Pro-
Emption would be underinclusive if other areas of law enforcement would
still be subject to the disparate purpose test. Again, these observations do
not render Equal Pro-Emption impossible, just doubtful under current
conditions.
Lastly, if the theory behind Equal Pro-Emption is that Congress implic-
itly intends a disparate-impact standard in immigration, then the proposal
must also contend with separation of powers.117 As already noted, the Court
has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as requiring discriminatory pur-
pose and pins the evidentiary burden on the claimant.118 Congress has some
leeway to prophylactically enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive
provisions, and in limited contexts has created liability schemes based on
discriminatory impact alone.119 But Congress does not have a roving license
to do so.120 As required by the Court, “[t]here must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted [by Congress] to that end.”121 Again, this is a demanding
presume that Arizona law requiring state officers to attempt to verify an individual’s immigra-
tion status would be interpreted by the state court in a way that would lead to constitutional
violations against immigrants or people of color, more generally).
114. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
115. Id. at 2507 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2012)).
116. Id. at 2510 (“At this stage, without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the
state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume § 2(B) will be construed in a way that creates
a conflict with federal law.”); see also id. (“So far as statutes fairly may be construed in such a
way as to avoid doubtful constitutional questions they should be so construed; and it is to be
presumed that state laws will be construed in that way by the state courts.” (citation omitted in
original) (quoting Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915))).
117. Motomura does not make this particular claim, but I consider it briefly here because
others may wish to pursue it. Moreover, this potential claim also has links to the Court’s
preemption doctrine, insofar as Equal Pro-Emption may be justified on the ground that Con-
gress intends for a disparate-impact standard in its immigration laws. See infra notes 124–127 R
and accompanying text (expressing skepticism that Congress intends this).
118. See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text. R
119. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (2012) (public accommodations); id.
§§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (education); id. §§ 3601–3619 (housing); id. §§ 12101–12117
(employment).
120. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
121. Id. at 520.
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standard. The federal statute cannot be overbroad,122 and its congruence and
proportionality to the state or local action sought to be prevented must be
well supported by evidence.123 As far as I am aware, Congress has not
amassed the evidence required to meet this test, much less relied on it when
passing any of the arguably relevant statutory provisions. From the Court’s
perspective, Congress will have much work to do if it intends to prophylacti-
cally adjust the Court’s disparate-purpose standard under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause for purposes of immigration enforcement.
B. Preemption Hurdles
Related to the foregoing point, Equal Pro-Emption also fits awkwardly
with the Court’s mainstream preemption doctrine. It is hornbook law that
Congress’s intent is the touchstone of a preemption analysis.124 Surely Con-
gress intends that states and localities will not enforce immigration law in
violation of individual rights. But that is question begging at best.
If states and localities are violating individual rights, then their actions
would conflict with Congress’s purposes (as well as the Constitution). Yet
without evidence demonstrating which states and localities are doing so, re-
viewing courts would have to presume intolerable levels of rights violations
across all jurisdictions. Although certainly possible, Congress likely does not
intend that presumption. Among other indicators, congressional devolution
of enforcement authority to state and local actors is a key feature of modern
immigration law. Many of the most important deportation grounds are tied
to criminal convictions under state law, and thus depend on state justice
122. Compare id. at 532–33 (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was
overbroad), with City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (finding that Con-
gress could “prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact” in “jurisdictions with a de-
monstrable history of intentional racial discrimination,” where the “risk of purposeful
discrimination” runs high), abrogated by Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013)
(striking down formula section of Voting Rights Act of 1965, explaining that “while any racial
discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to
remedy that problem speaks to current conditions,” based on current factual findings).
123. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369–71 (2001) (holding
that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act was not congruent and proportional to any
documented pattern of constitutional violations by states); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 88–91 (2000) (noting same problem with respect to the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530–31 (striking down law as applied for, among
other things, lack of evidence); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966) (hold-
ing that Congress had a factual basis to conclude that New York’s literacy requirement “consti-
tuted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause”); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 333–34 (1966) (noting the need for evidence, and
finding sufficient evidence to uphold various provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
124. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103
(1963); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (“In preemption analy-
sis, courts should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not superseded
‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Eleva-
tor Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
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systems all the way down to arresting officers.125 Moreover, Congress ex-
pressly contemplates federal and state cooperation in immigration enforce-
ment.126 Thus, the law on the books expressly carves out a role for states and
localities to shape immigration law in action. Perhaps Congress should in-
clude a specific antidiscrimination provision directed at state and local im-
migration enforcement for all the reasons that Motomura and others
suggest.127 As yet, however, that has not been a political reality.
In past eras, the Court sporadically invoked The Civil Rights Act of 1870
as a makeweight in preemption analysis.128 But the Court also found equal
protection violations in almost all of those cases; thus, the factual predicate
for rights violations was established in ways that Equal Pro-Emption would
not require.129 Even more to the point, however, all of those cases predated
the Court’s modern approaches to immigration preemption130 and equal
protection.131 Tellingly, there was no mention of the Civil Rights Act of 1870,
or a more sublime equality norm, in either Chamber of Commerce of the
United States v. Whiting or Arizona v. United States.132
Again, I hope to be clear about my claims. I am not claiming that im-
porting an equality norm into immigration preemption doctrine is impossi-
ble. And, I agree with Motomura that it could venerably close some of the
125. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1101(a)(43) (2012) (including both state and fed-
eral crimes within the definition of an “aggravated felony” that is grounds for deportation).
On the expansion of crime-based removal from the United States, see Daniel Kanstroom,
Deportation Nation (2007). See also Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants,
Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367 (2006).
126. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (describing performance of immigration officer func-
tions by state officers and employees); id. § 1373(c) (requiring federal government to respond
to state and local inquiries about any individual’s immigration status); see also Michael J.
Wishnie, Introduction: Immigration and Federalism, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 283, 287
(2002) (“[T]he 1996 immigration laws sought to encourage state and local law enforcement
officials to collaborate in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.”).
127. See, e.g., pp. 134–35; see also sources cited supra note 11. R
128. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376–77 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69–70 (1941). The
key provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 provides in relevant part that “[a]ll persons . . .
shall have the same right” as “white citizens” in “every State and Territory” to certain enumer-
ated rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012); see also Guttentag, supra note 11, at 3 (“[T]he preemp- R
tive force of the 1870 Act—and of the immigrant equality component of immigration
preemption—has been largely overlooked or forgotten.”).
129. See Guttentag, supra note 11, at 29–38. In Hines, the court ruled solely on preemp- R
tion grounds. 312 U.S. at 62. In Graham and Takahashi, the Court separately ruled in favor of
the lawfully present claimants on equal protection and preemption grounds. See Graham, 403
U.S. at 376–77; Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419–20.
130. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (making no mention of the Civil
Rights Act of 1870, or an equality norm, in upholding one state law and preempting three
others); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (upholding state
law against preemption challenge and making no mention of the Civil Rights Act of 1870); De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354–56 (1975) (same).
131. See supra Section III.A (tracing the Court’s disparate purpose requirement to Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
132. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492; Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968.
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gap between the Court’s discriminatory-purpose test in equal protection ju-
risprudence and the discriminatory effects chronicled in immigration en-
forcement. That said, however, Equal Pro-Emption (black-box
proposition 5) is an unlikely doctrinal scenario. Immigration theorists
should account for that now, before putting their weight behind the rest of
Black-Box Immigration Federalism (propositions 1 through 4). Otherwise,
the full range of normative tradeoffs inhering in Black-Box Immigration
Federalism’s doctrinal and institutional arrangements may be missed, and
too late to undo.
Conclusion
Central to Motomura’s project, and my focus here, are the hydraulics of
immigration authority when the congressional spigot is closed. With Con-
gress gridlocked, the executive branch and subfederal jurisdictions have
rushed to the void. These political developments, in turn, have spawned a
mix of constitutional questions about how separation of powers, federalism,
and individual rights apply, or should apply, to the field of immigration.
There are no easy answers, for at least two reasons. First, immigration is
sometimes treated exceptionally under the law.133 But because immigration
is sometimes treated exceptionally, and other times not, there are no clear
guideposts for which constitutional norms to relax, and which to insist on,
in this new era of institutional conflict.134 Second, and relatedly, the types of
constitutional controversies emerging today are often multidimensional and
dynamic. Properly understood, cases like Arizona v. United States135 and
United States v. Texas136 are arguably about separation of powers, federalism,
and rights simultaneously. As yet, however, we do not have ready-made ana-
lytic frames to grapple with the constitutional and normative tradeoffs in
the undertheorized space where separation of powers, federalism, and rights
intersect.
Immigration Outside the Law contributes mightily to this nascent pro-
ject. Pushing past convention, Motomura’s work offers much to celebrate,
both in his innovative framework for understanding today’s immigration
debates, and his vision for how that framework may translate into equality,
morality, the rule of law, and constitutionalism more generally. His outlook,
however, depends in large measure on fresh conceptions of law and new
structural arrangements that will require judicial buy-in. Even with judicial
buy-in, or partial buy-in, it is uncertain that the structural arrangements
championed by Motomura will deliver the stable and widespread integration
of undocumented immigrants that he envisions. Black-Box Immigration
Federalism may be right. But it should not be taken for granted.
133. See sources cited supra notes 14–15. R
134. See David S. Rubenstein, Self-Help Structuralism, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1619, 1657–59
(2015) (teasing out this idea through a theoretical frame of constitutional self-help).
135. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506.
136. No. 15-40238 (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 2015) cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257, (U.S. Jan. 19,
2016) (No. 15-674).
